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Locke: Board of Education v. Dowell: A Look at the New Phase in Desegreg

COMMENT
BOARD OF EDUCATION V DOWELL: A LOOK AT

THE NEW PHASE IN DESEGREGATION LAW
Board of Education v. Dowell,
111 S. Ct. 630 (1991).
Since the Thirty-Ninth Congress debated and passed the Fourteenth Amendment,1 the impact of the Equal Protection Clause2 on
segregation has evolved within a framework of constant debate.3
Even the United States Supreme Court swung from one extreme to
the other when it overruled Plessy v. Ferguson4 in Brown v. Board
of Educations ("Brown 1") holding that racial segregation "generates
a feeling of inferiority as to [black students'] status in the community
that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
'6
Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.
undone ....
In the twenty-five years since Brown I was handed down, a body
of case law has developed to guide the federal courts in applying
equitable remedies to dismantle the "vestiges"7 of desegregation,
"root and branch"8 with "all deliberate speed" 9 in order to restore
the victims of discrimination "to the position they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct." °
In recent years however, there has been a series of cases in the

1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
2. Ict ("No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
3. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation
Decisions, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955); Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L. 421 (1960); Mark G. Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity
and the Courts, 51 TEXAS L. REv. 411 (1973).
4. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter Brown 1].
6. Id, at 494-95.

7. See Swam v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971).
8. See Board of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 458-61 (1979); Keyes v. School Dist.
413 U.S. 189, 200 (1973); Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 460 (1972);
1,
No.
Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968).
9. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) [hereinafter Brown I].
10. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974).
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federal courts, brought by school boards seeking to lift the injunctions
originally imposed as a remedy to segregation." The core of the
school boards' argument is that they have complied with the courts'
injunctions in good faith for a substantial period of time in an effort
to correct the vestiges of past discrimination, and therefore the injunctions should be lifted. 12 Any segregation that remains with respect to
the composition of the public schools is now a result of factors beyond local school board control, such as segregated housing patterns.13
The culmination of these cases 14 occurred in Board of Educa-

11. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991); Riddick v. School Bd.,
784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986); United States v. Board of Educ.,
794 F.2d 1541 (lth Cir. 1986); Spangler v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1979).
12. Dowell, 111 S. CL at 633-34.
13. Id.
14. It should be noted that since Dowell was decided, the Supreme Court has handed
down a subsequent case also dealing with the termination of segregation injunctions. Freeman
v. Pitts, 112 S. CL 1430 (1992). The issue in Freeman was whether the district court may
terminate its jurisdiction over part of a desegregation plan where the school board had
achieved constitutional compliance in four of the six areas specified in Green v. County Sch.
Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968), while retaining jurisdiction over the parts of the plan where vestiges of de jure segregation remain. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1441-42. For a more in depth
discussion of Green, see infra notes 28-31 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court, reversing the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, held that the District Court may give
up jurisdiction incrementally, retaining jurisdiction over certain portions of the plan while
relinquishing others. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1145-46. The Court then listed the factors that
the lower courts should consider when deciding whether or not to give up jurisdiction over
the desegregation decrees in increments:
[Whether there has been full and satisfactory compliance with the decree in those
aspects of the system where supervision is to be withdrawn; whether retention of
judicial control is necessary or practicable to achieve compliance with the decree in
other facets of the school system; and whether the school district has demonstrated
to the public, and to the parents and students of the once disfavored race, its good
faith commitment to the whole of the court's decree and to those provisions of the
law and the constitution that were the predicate for judicial intervention in the first
instane.
Id at 1446.
The Court then continued, elaborating on these guidelines:
In considering these factors a court should give particular attention to the school
system's record of compliance. A school system is better positioned to demonstrate
its good-faith commitment to a constitutional course of action when its policies
form a consistent pattern of lawful conduct directed to eliminating earlier violations. And with the passage of time the degree to which racial imbalances continue
to represent vestiges of constitutional violation may diminish, and the practicality
and efficacy of various remedies can be evaluated with more precision.
These are the premises that guided our formulation of Dowell of the duties
of a district court during the final phases of a desegregation case . ...
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tion v. Dowel, 15 where the Supreme Court, in a 5-3 decision, over
an outraged dissent written by Justice Marshall, held that when determining whether or not to dissolve a desegregation injunction, the
district court should decide "whether the Board made a sufficient
[The] Court should adshowing of constitutional compliance ....
good
faith with the desegdress whether the Board [has] complied in
regation decree since it was entered, and whether the vestiges of past
discrimination [have] been eliminated to the extent practicable."16
This Comment analyzes the dissent's criticisms of the majority holding in Dowell, in an effort to ascertain whether the holding is consistent with Brown I and its progeny, or a curtailing of well established
constitutional rights.17 Subsequently, this Comment offers several

While Freeman is clearly a further development in the desegregation case law since
Dowell, it is not the focal point of the controversy surrounding the substantive standard for
the termination of the injunction. Rather, it deals with a more procedural issue. Therefore,
this Comment does not address the case.
15. 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991).
16. Id at 638.
17. It should be noted that as a general matter, desegregation orders are still being
enforced successfully across the country. James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: "All-Out"
School Desegregation Explained, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1467 (1990) (listing some of the
cities presently operating successfully under desegregation orders: Buffalo, CharlotteMecklinburg, Columbus, Dayton, Denver, Greenville, Jacksonville, Louisville, Minneapolis,
Nashville-Davidson, St. Louis, San Diego, Tampa-St. Petersburg, and Wilmington-New Castle).
During the Reagan Administration, a federal government study found that desegregation
injunctions have led to a national trend away from isolating black students in black schools.
See FINIS WELCH & AUDREY LIGHT, NEW EVIDENCE ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 969-70,
974-75 (1987). In the 125 schools studied, the numbers of black students attending "minority"
schools declined from 62% to 30%, while the numbers attending "white schools" rose from
17% to 44%. Id
Additionally, in the 1980s, the federal courts ordered new -desegregation injunctions in:
Buffalo, Arthur v. Nyquist, 514 F. Supp. 1133 (W.D.N.Y.), ajfd mer., 661 F.2d 907 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981); Indianapolis, United States v. Board of Sch.
Comm'rs, 637 F.2d 1101, 1104 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980); Kansas City,
Jenkins v. Missouri, 904 F.2d 415, 419 (8th Cir. 1990), and Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d
1295, 1299-301 (8th Cir. 1988), aftd, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990); Little Rock, Little Rock
School Dist. v. Pulaski County Special School Dist. No. 1, 778 F.2d 404, 407-08 (8th Cir.
1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186 (1986); St. Louis, Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d
1294, 1297 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 816 (1984); Yonkers; Board of Educ.,
624 F. Supp. 1276, 1288-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aft'd, 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 2821 (1988); and Pittsburgh's suburbs, Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 539 F.
Supp. 335, 338 (W.D. Pa. 1982), aft'd, 703 F.2d 722 (3d Cir. 1983). Cities with litigation
seeking new or expanded desegregation injunctions include Charleston, United States v.
Charleston Cty. Sch. Dist., 738 F. Supp. 1513, 1515 (D.S.C. 1990); Fort Wayne, Parents for
Quality Educ. with Integration, Inc. v. Fort Wayne Community Schs. Corp., 662 F. Supp.
1475, 1477, 1482 (N.D. Ind. 1987); Queens, New York, Parents Ass'n v. Ambach, 738 F.2d
574, 580, 583 (2d Cir. 1984).
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alternative solutions as compromises between the majority and dissenting opinions.
I.

THE PRIOR CASE LAW

In order to analyze Dowell, the standards laid down by the Supreme Court in the preceding fifty years must be examined. This will
allow for a detailed comparison of the Equal Protection Clause as
interpreted by the Warren Court in 1954 and the Rehnquist Court
today.
Generally, any examination of the case law of desegregation
8 In Brown I, the Court
begins with Brown v. Board of Education."
recognized that "segregation has a tendency to [hinder] the educational and mental development of negro children and deprive them of
some of the benefits they would receive in a[n] . . . integrated system."19 The impact is magnified "when it has the sanction of the
law." 20 Therefore, "in the field of public education the doctrine of
'separate but equal' has no place." 2'
Although the Court found that separate was inherently unequal in
Brown I, it did not address adequate remedies until a year later in
Brown v. Board of Education ("Brown I").22 In Brown II, the court
delegated the responsibility of fashioning equitable remedies to the
federal district courts because of their "proximity to local conditions."' The Supreme Court then ordered the district courts to take
such actions as are "necessary and proper to admit to all public
schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed
the parties to these cases."24
Brown II was followed by a variety of cases where local school
boards implemented plans designed to avoid integration at any
cost.' In reaction to these plans, as well as others which were not

18. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). It should be noted that the road to Brown I began in 1950 in
two cases: Sweat v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents,
339 U.S. 637 (1950). Both cases had to do with black graduate students challenging the
segregation of their education as violations of the Equal Protection Clause. In both cases the
Court found for the student, holding the separate education to be unequal. In both of these
cases however, the inequality was in some way tangible (i.e., poorer facilities, etc.).
19. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 494.
20. IdL
21. Id at 495.
22.

349 U.S. 294 (1955).

23. Id at 299.
24. Id at 301.
25. See, e.g., Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Goss v. Board of Educ.,
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so obviously motivated by racism, 2 6 the Supreme Court, in Green v.
County School Board," upon finding the school system to be unconstitutionally segregated28 placed an "affirmative duty [on local school
boards] to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a
unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated."2 9
Brown II was not merely a call for a school board to act without
discriminatory intent, but rather a "call for the dismantling of wellentrenched dual systems tempered by an awareness that complex and
multifaceted problems would arise which would require time and
flexibility for a successful resolution."" Additionally, the Court listed six factors to consider when evaluating attempts to desegregate: (1)
composition of the student body; (2) faculty; (3) staff; (4) transportation; (5) extracurricular activities; and (6) facilities.3 1
The most important desegregation case, however, in terms of
offering guidance to the district courts, is Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education.32 In Swann, the court first reiterated the school board's affirmative duty to desegregate. 33 The Court
then touched upon the distinction between de facto and de jure segregation. 4 De jure segregation occurs when the court finds that the
segregation was the result of a school board's intent to discriminate,
either past or present 35 It is this intent to discriminate which is critical to finding a constitutional violation.36 Without a finding of the
373 U.S. 683 (1963); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). In Griffin, the court struck down
a plan to close down all the public schools and then fund all white private schools by tax
credits. Griffin, 377 U.S. at 232-34. In Goss, the Court struck down a plan that rezoned

school districts providing for initial desegregation, and then allowing any student in a minority in a particular school to transfer to where he would be in a majority. Goss, 373 U.S. at
688-89. In Cooper, the governor of Arkansas used the national guard to block black students
from being admitted to an all white Little Rock high school. The Court enjoined the governor from blockading the school and federal troops were sent in to back the court order.
Cooper, 358 U.S. at 11-12.
26. See, e.g., Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (mplementing a "freedom
of choice" plan allowing students to choose to attend whatever school they want is a viola-

tion of the equal protection clause).
27. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
28. Id. at 435.
29. Id. at 437-38.
30. I at 437.
31. Id at 435.
32. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
33. IX at 16.
34. See id at 17-18.
35. See id at 15. For a more extensive discussion of de jure and de facto segregation,
see, Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 205-08 (1973).
36. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208; Swann,
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requisite intent, there is only de facto segregation, and no equal protection violation.37 Additionally, the Court noted the desirability of
-using a neighborhood school policy absent the existence of school
board intent to discriminate. 38 This is especially important because it
shows that even as far back as Swann, the Court implicitly recognized the importance of local influence over public education and the
tension that may exist between that influence and those rights protected by the Equal Protection Clause. The Court's recognition of the
validity of a neighborhood school policy absent any discriminatory
intent is vital. Given the present state of the desegregation law, a
neighborhood school policy, combined with segregated residential
patterns, could easily produce segregated public schools, while not
violating equal protection standards.39
The Court then addressed four specific issues: (1) the extent to
which racial quotas may be used in forming a remedial order; (2)
whether a single race school necessarily means that a constitutional
violation exists; (3) whether redrawing school attendance zones is
permissible in forming an equitable remedy; and (4) what limits, if
any, exist on the use of busing as a tool for achieving desegregation.' The court held that ratios of black to white students as a
whole may be used to help formulate a desegregation plan, but that
precise ratios may not serve as an absolute requirement in achieving
integration.4' The existence of a single race school does not necessarily mean that desegregation has not occurred.42 It does, however,
require close scrutiny by the courts, and the burden is on the school
board to show that the single race school is not a result of intentional
segregation.43 The redrawing of school attendance zones is permissi-

402 U.S. at 15.
37. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 15.
38. Id at 30-31.
39. This notion is extremely relevant when examining Justice Marshall's dissent in
Dowell. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 111 S. Ct 630, 639 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See
infra notes 142-61 and accompanying text.
40. Swann, 402 U.S. at 22.
41. Id at 25.
42. Id
43. Id at 26. In subsequent cases, the Court defined the burdens in terms of a rebuttable presumpqon. The existence of a one race school, brings with it the presumption of
unconstitutional segregation. This presumption may be rebutted by the school board. See
Board of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Board of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526
(1979). This burden is an extremely heavy one as it requires the school board to prove a
negative. See generally CHOPER ET AL, THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDs AND DEVELOPMENTS,
1978-1979, 253-54 (1979).
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ble as a component of an integration plan." The redrawn zones do
not have to be either compact or contiguous.4 5 Additionally, busing
was approved as a method for achieving integration, as long as the
health and welfare of the children were not put in jeopardy as a consequence.'
In Keyes v. School District No. 1 4 7 the Court reiterated the importance of the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation,
emphasizing that de jure segregation would be found only where the
intent to segregate existed.4 Otherwise, there was no constitutional
violation.49 The Court also held that unconstitutional segregation in a
substantial part of the school district was sufficient to make a prima
facie case for segregation throughout the entire district, regardless of
whether the requisite intent was found throughout the entire district.'e The burden of rebutting this presumption is on the school
board. 51
Since Keyes was handed down in 1973, the Supreme Court has
limited the scope of desegregation remedies in several decisions.52 In
Milliken v. Bradley ("Milliken r'),,3 the district court found that the
Detroit school system had practiced a policy of de jure segregation.' However, because most of the Detroit schools were at least
75% black, a desegregation plan operating within the city limits
would be ineffective. 55 The lower court therefore ordered a desegregation plan that involved busing children between the mostly white
suburbs and the mostly black city.' The Supreme Court, in a 5-4
decision, over several dissents,5 7 including a vigorous dissent written

44. Swann, 402 U.S. at 28-29.
45.

Id.

46.
47.
48.
49.

Id at 30-31.
413 U.S. 189 (1973).
Id at 208.
Id

50. Id
51. Id at 210-11.
52. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 US. 267 (1977); Board of Educ. v. Spangler, 427
U.S. 424 (1976); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
53. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). Milliken I is sometimes described as the beginning of the end
for desegregation. See, e.g., LAWRENCE TRIE, AMERICAN CONSTTUTIONAL LAW 1495 (2d ed.
1988); Joy Hannel, The Future of Desegregation After Dowell: Returning to Pre-Brown
Days?, 56 Mo. L. REV. 1141, 1144 (1991).
54. Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 748-49.
55. Id at 725-26.
56. Id at 732-33.
57. Id at 757 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Id at 762 (White, ., dissenting).
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by Justice Marshall," held that if there was no constitutional violation found to have occurred in the mostly white suburbs, then a constitutionally based remedy could not be imposed upon them. 59 The
decision relied on the firmly entrenched rule that a constitutional
remedy cannot exceed the scope of the violation.' In arriving at this
holding, the Court placed a great deal of emphasis on the local community interests at stake in operating a school district: "No single
tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control
over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought
essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support
for public schools and the quality of the educational process." 6 Several years later, in Milliken v. Bradley ("Milliken IF'),62 the Supreme
Court reiterated its point, holding that in addition to considering the
nature and scope of the constitutional violation, it is imperative that
the court give due weight to "the interests of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs, consistent with the Constitution."63 These two holdings are important because the Court is now
explicitly recognizing both the legitimate interest that a locality has in
controlling its public education system, and the conflict these interests
may have with constitutionally protected rights."
In Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler,65 the District
Court implemented a desegregation plan which used racial quotas in a
rigid fashion, combined with a yearly reassignment policy." Specifically, the school board was given a quota for its schools, and each
year, if the quota was not met for whatever reason, students were
reassigned in order to comply with the court order.67 The plan was
based on the notion that no student who was in the minority race
should be in the majority of a given student body.6" The school

58. Id. at 781 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 745.
60. Swaim v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22 (1971).
61. Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 741-42.
62. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
63. Id. at 280-81.
64. This recognition, however, was not a new insight into desegregation law. In Swann,
the Court implicitly recognized this same notion when it addressed the potential desirability
of neighborhood school policy for a locality. See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
65. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
66. Id at 433-34. For discussion of the use a racial quotas as a part of a desegregation
plan, see supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
67. Spangier, 427 U.S. at 433-34.
68. Id.
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board complied with the court order for a year, before it fell outside
the boundaries of the quota as a result of factors beyond the school
board's control, such as population movements. 69 The Supreme
Court (as in Milliken 1) struck down the order because it imposed too
broad a remedy: enforcing an injunction for racially imbalanced
schools where the imbalance was not the result of a constitutional
violation, having nothing to do with the school board's intent to dis70
criminate.
II. THE MOST RECENT PHASE IN THE CASE LAW
Beginning in the late 1970s, the focus of court decisions has
shifted from limiting the breadth 71 of desegregation orders to lifting
those orders entirely. In Spangler v. Board of Education,7 3 the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that nine years of compliance with a court desegregation order in good faith was sufficient
to accomplish the order's goals.' In reaching its decision, the Ninth
Circuit recognized the paramount local interests involved in maintaining a public school system.75 Consequently, the district court's denial
of the school board's motion was overruled and the order was lifted.76 The district court's central reason for denying the board's request was that the board planned to return to a neighborhood school
policy.' The lower court denied the board's motion in spite of the

69. Id at 434.
70. Id at 431. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text (addressing intent as a
prerequisite to an equal protection violation).
71. See e.g., Board of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976); Milliken v. Bradley,
418 U.S. 717 (1974). Both of these cases focused on the injunctions imposed by the lower
courts, finding them to be invalid because their scope was too broad. Both cases held that
the breadth of the constitutional remedy may not exceed the scope of the violation.
72. See e.g., Pitts v. Freeman, 887 F.2d 1438 (4th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1430
(1992); Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986);
Spangler v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1979).
73. 611 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1979).
74. Id at 1241 (citing Milliken II, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977)). The Court's decision
was also affected by the Board's testimony that it would continue with affirmative action in
support of integration. Id
75. Spangler, 611 F.2d at 1241.
76. Id
77. Id at 1243 (Kennedy, J., concurring). It should be noted that Judge Kennedy's
concurring opinion was joined by Judge Anderson, giving it majority support of the three
member panel.
A neighborhood school policy has been held to be in compliance with the Equal
Protection Clause absent a showing of segrative intent. See, e.g., Milliken II, 433 U.S. 267,
280 n.14 (1977); Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 434-36 (1976); Swam v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S.
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no longer acting with the requisite unlawful discrimifact that it was
78
natory intent.
In Riddick v. School Board of Norfolk,79 the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit upheld a school board's plan calling for an end
to mandatory busing." The main reason for the school board's desire to stop busing was because "white flight" was occurring in such
magnitude that it was outweighing the effects of the desegregation
order.8" The Fourth Circuit followed Spangler, carrying it further.

1, 26 (1971).
78. Spangler, 611 F.2d at 1241.
79. 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986).
80. Id. at 526, 533.
81. Id at 526. For a more in depth discussion of "white flight" and its impact on
desegregation, see Paul Gerwitz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 628-65 (1983);
Note, Allocating the Burden of ProofAfter a Finding of Unitariness in School Desegregation
Litigation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 653, 663 n.66 (1987). White flight is a particularly troublesome form of resistance to desegregation injunctions because it is resistance by retreat rather
than by obstruction. Gerwitz, supra, at 629.
There has been a considerable amount of empirical research done on the effects of
white flight, beginning with, . CoLEm ET AL., TRENDS IN SCHOOL SEGREC1ON, 1968-73
(1975) (finding that integration plans do accelerate white flight, especially in the presence of
surrounding predominantly white suburbs). A number of subsequent works debated the validity
of this notion. See Armor, WhUte Flight and the Future of School Desegregation, in SCHOOL
DESEGREOATION: PAST, PRESENT, AND FtmuRE 187, 187-96 (W. Stephan & J. Fagin eds.,
1980); Thomas F. Pettigrew & Robert L. Green, School Desegregation in Large Cities: A
Critique of the Coleman "White Flight" Thesis, 46 HARv. EDuc. REv. 1 (1976).
For the most part, this controversy seems to have subsided. Most scholars now agree
that there has been a general trend of whites away from urban centers, but this movement is
accelerated by the presence of a desegregation order. See Christine H. Rossell, Applied Social
Science Research: What Does It Say About the Effectiveness of Desegregation Plans?, 12 J.
LEGAL STUD. 69, 80-94 (1983) (summarizing the general agreement that exists among scholars). Additionally, these results are also summarized by two volumes of Congressional hearings. See School Desegregation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 160 (1982) [hereinafter
House School Desegregation Hearings] (statement of G. Orfield); id at 205-06 (statement of
D. Armor); id at 217-18 (statement of C. Rosell); Court Ordered School Busing: Hearings
on S. 528 S. 1005, S. 1147, S. 1647, S. 1743, and S. 1760 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 193 (1982)
[hereinafter Senate Busing Hearings] (statement of J. Ross); id at 210 (statement of C.
Clotfelter); i. at 232 (statement of R. Farley).
Several cities have shown strong evidence bearing out this proposition. including
Boston, Los Angeles, and Memphis. The Senate Busing Hearings, supra, at 198-99, have
shown that after the 1975 desegregation order in Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216 (D.
Mass. 1975), aft'd, 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 426 U.S. 935 (1976), 60% of the
Boston's families with children in the public schools either moved or began sending their
children to parochial schools. In Los Angeles, after a similar order, white enrollment fell
from 37% to 24% between 1976 and 1980. House School Desegregation Hearings, supra, at
207, 214 (statement of D. Armor). In Memphis, it was estimated that white enrollment
dropped literally in half because of the school desegregation plan. See George Noblit &
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Once a school system was found to be unitary,2 the injunction must
be terminated. 3 The Court continued, holding that once unitary status has been achieved, in order to challenge a new school board plan,
a new intent to discriminate must be shown."I
In 1989, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit adopted a
more stringent test for school boards seeking to have the courts re5 Spemove desegregation orders in Dowell v. Board of Education."

Thomas Collins, School Flight and School Policy: Desegregation and Resegregation in the
Memphis City Schools, 10 URB. REV. 203, 206 (1978). A Cleveland Study showed that its
desegregation injunction caused white enrollment to drop by over one-third. OFFICE ON SCH.
MONITORING
o
COMMUNITY RELATIONS, ENROLLMENT DECLINE AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN CLEVELAND: AN ANALYSIS OF TRENDS AND CAUSES 23 (1982). Other cities where
the evidence supports similar conclusions are Birmingham, Chattanooga, Dallas, Dayton,
Denver, Detroit, Oklahoma City, Omaha, Pasadena, San Francisco, and Seattle. See House
School Desegregation Hearings, supra, at 207, 214 (statement of D. Armor) (claiming that
desegregation plans account for anywhere between 30% and 70% of white flight in these

cities).
Although there is a consensus regarding the effect of desegregation orders on white
flight, there is still debate over the magnitude of the effect Gerwitz, supra, at 630; Michael
Giles et al., White Flight and Percent Black The Tipping Point Re-examined, 56 Soc. Sci.
Q. 85 (1975); Rosell, supra, at 80-94 (summarizing studies). The "tipping point" refers to the
point at which an influx of blacks under a desegregation order causes a comparable outflux
whites. See also William H. Frey, Central City White Flight: Racial and Nonracial Causes,
44 AMER. Soc. REV. 425 (1979); John Goering, Neighborhood Tipping and Racial Transition:
A Review of the Social Science Evidence, 44 J. AMER. INST. PLANNERS 68 (1978); Thomas
C. Schelling, The Process of Residential Segregation: Neighborhood Tipping, in RACIAL
DISCRMINATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 157 (A. Pascal ed., 1972).
The issue regarding tipping that has confronted courts in the last fifteen years is
whether the courts may fashion remedies that are tailored to avoid the possible neutralizing
effects that white flight might otherwise have on desegregation orders. Gerwitz, supra, at 63031. See Estes v. NAACP, 444 U.S. 437 (1980). This issue is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
82. For the purposes of this Comment, the term "unitary- will be considered synonymous with "desegregated" for the purposes of constitutional analysis. There has been a certain
degree of confusion surrounding the term. See, e.g., United States v. Overton, 834 F.2d 1171,
1175 (5th Cir. 1987); NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403 (lth Cir. 1985); Vaughns v.
Board of Educ., 758 F.2d 983, 988 (4th Cir. 1985). However, elucidating that confusion is
beyond the scope of this Comment. For a somewhat broader discussion of the term, which
reaches the same conclusion, see Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. CL 630, 635-36 (1991).
For an attempt to shed light on the confusion, see G. Scott Williams, Unitary School Systems
and Underlying Vestiges of State-Imposed Segregation, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 794 (1987).
83. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 535.
84. Id at 537. Riddick has been criticized as placing too harsh a burden on plaintiffs.
See Dennis G. Terez, Protecting the Remedy of Unitary Schools, 37 CASE W. L. REV. 41, 70
(1986) (advocating a shifting burden so that school boards must show that their plans conform to the unitary status); Mitchell F. Ducey, Note, The Unitary Finding and the Threat of
School Resegregation: Riddick v. School Board, 65 N.C. L. REV. 617, 638 (1987) (questioning a plaintiff's ability to meet the rigorous standards handed down in Riddick).
85. 890 F.2d 1483 (10th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. CL 630 (1991).
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cifically, the Tenth Circuit held that for a school board to obtain such
relief, "'nothing less than a clear showing of grievous wrong evolved
by new and unforseen conditions... to change what was decreed
after years of litigation with the consent of all concerned,'" would
suffice.8 6 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to Dowell to resolve
the conflict in the standards laid down by the Tenth Circuit and those
laid down by the Ninth and Fourth Circuits in Spangler and
87
Riddick.

M.

BOARD OF EDUCATION V. DOWELL 8

The litigation of the school desegregation issue in Dowell began
in 1961, when black students and their families sued the Oklahoma
City Board of Education ("School Board" or "Board") to end the de
jure segregation existing in the public school system. 89 In 1963, the
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma found that Oklahoma City had intentionally segregated both schools and housing."°
Two years later, the district court found the School Board's attempts
to desegregate based on a rezoning plan to be inadequate. 9 Because
the School Board had been unable to successfully eliminate the vestiges of past discrimination the district court eventually imposed the
"Finger Plan."' Under the Finger Plan, kindergarten-aged children
were assigned to neighborhood schools unless their parents opted
otherwise. 3 Children in grades one through four attended previously
all white schools, thereby causing black children to be bused to those
schools.' Children in grade five attended formerly all black schools,

86. Id. at 1490 (quoting United States v. Swift Co. 286 U.S. 106 (1932)).
87. Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S.CL 630, 635 (1991).
88. 111 S.Ct. 630 (1991).
89. Id
90. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 219 F. Supp. 427 (W.D. Okla 1963).
91. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 244 F. Supp. 971, 975 (W.D. Okla. 1965). The desegregation plan involved neighborhood rezoning which still resulted in one race schools. Id The
plan allowed for a student in the minority at any school to transfer to another school where
he would be in the majority. Id
It should also be noted that Oklahoma had at one time had residential segregation
imposed by the state, and its effects still lingered in the public schools because of discrimination by realtors and financial institutions. Id at 976-79. This finding by the district court is
important to consider when analyzing Justice Marshall's dissent in the Supreme Court opinion. Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 639 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
92. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 338 F. Supp. 1256, aft'd, 465 F.2d 1012 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1041 (1972).
93. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 633 (1991).
94. Id
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thereby causing white children to be bused." Children in higher
grades were bused to a variety of other areas in order to maintain
integrated schools.' In already integrated neighborhoods, there were
stand-alone schools encompassing all grades.'
In 1977, pursuant to a motion by the School Board, the district
court held that the Finger Plan had "worked and that substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements ha[d] been achieved.""'
The court continued, "Now sensitized to the constitutional implications of its conduct and with a new awareness of its responsibility to
citizens of all races, the Board is entitled to pursue in good faith its
legitimate policies without the continuing constitutional supervision of
the Court."99 In spite of this recognition of the effects of the Finger
Plan, the lower court did not explicitly terminate the injunction." e
In 1984, demographic changes began to place greater burdens on
young black children."' As more neighborhoods became integrated,
more stand-alone schools were established." ° This increased the distance between the remaining schools that still had students being
bused, and left black children having to commute longer distances. 03 To alleviate this problem, the School Board adopted the "Student Reassignment Plan," which contained a neighborhood school
policy for children in grades kindergarten through four."° Busing
continued for students in grades five through twelve, and any student
could transfer from a school where he was in the majority to where
he was in the minority."0
One year later, a "motion to reopen the case" was filed, arguing
that the School Board had never obtained a unitary status and that
implementation of the student reassignment plan would only serve to

95. id
96. Id
97. Id
98. Id at 634.

99. Id
100. While this point appears trivial at first, it becomes critical to the Supreme Court's
analysis in terms of finding standing for the appellants. Id at 635. The Court found that
because the district court did not explicitly dissolve the injunction, the lower court's finding
of unitary status (which was not appealed) was not res judicata with respect to dissolving the

injunction. Id.
101.

Id

102. Id
103. Id

104. Id
105. Id
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reimpose segregation. 6 Additionally, the motion claimed that the
plan would leave approximately one-quarter of the city's schools with
a 90% black student body, and one-third with a 90% non-black majority."° Slightly less than one-half of the schools would remain in06
tegrated.
The district court denied the motion, holding that its 1977 finding of unitary status was res judicata, and that the school district had
remained unitary."'° Specifically, the lower court held that the
School Board, the student body, the support staff, the faculty and

administration, the transportation, the extra curricular activities, and
the facilities were all integrated." ° Therefore, in order to bring
this
11
suit, the plaintiffs needed a new showing of intent to segregate. 1
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed," 2 holding
that while the finding of unitary status in 1977 was binding, there
was nothing in that order indicating explicitly that the desegregation
injunction was lifted."' Because the injunction was never terminated, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that the School Board was still subject
to the order, and therefore, the student reassignment plan could be
challenged." 4 The Court of Appeals then remanded the case for determination of whether the injunction should be limited or modified." 5
On remand, the district court found that the Finger Plan was no
longer tenable because of demographic changes." 6 The Board had
done nothing within the prior twenty-five years to promote residential
segregation, and busing had occurred for over ten years in good faith
compliance with the injunction." 7 The existing circumstances causing segregation in housing patterns were too attenuated to be considered a vestige of former school segregation."' Consequently, the
106. Id
107. Id
108. Id.
109. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 606 F. Supp. 1548, 1557 (W.D. Okla. 1985).
110. Id. at 1554 (relying on the standards set forth in Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391
U.S. 430, 435 (1968).
111. Dowell, 606 F. Supp. at 1554.
112. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 795 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938
(1986).
113. Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 635 (1991).
114. Dowell, 795 F.2d at 1521.
115. Id. at 1523.
116. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 634.
117. Id.
118. ld
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Court vacated
the injunction and returned the school district to local
1 19
control.
Again, the Tenth Circuit reversed,"' recognizing that "'an injunction takes on a life of its own and becomes an edict quite independent of the law it is meant to effectuate.'" 12 1 Therefore, the
Tenth Circuit, relying on United States v. Swift & Co., 2 the seminal case with regard to dissolving injunctions, held, "the inquiry [before the court] is whether the changes are so important that dangers,
once substantial, have become attenuated to a shadow."" 2 Consequently, a party seeking relief from an injunction "'must demonstrate
dramatic changes in the conditions unforseen at the time of the decree
that both render the protections of the decree unnecessary to effectuate the rights of the beneficiary and impose extreme and unexpectedly
oppressive hardships on the obligor. '"" 4
Applying this stringent test, the Tenth Circuit relied on the fact
that a high percentage of the schools would become one race schools
if the student reassignment plan were implemented, and held that
Oklahoma City's situation had not changed sufficiently to warrant
termination of the injunction."z The court concluded that regardless
of a finding of unitary status, the school board is still obligated by
the affirmative6 duty not to impede the process of disestablishing the
dual system.1
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit's holding that the school board was still bound by the desegregation order
in spite of the district court's 1977 finding of unitary status, because
the order did not explicitly dissolve the decree. 7 Therefore, the
plaintiffs did not need a new showing of discriminatory intent to

119. Id.
120. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 890 F.2d 1483 (10th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. CL 630
(1991).
121. Id. at 1490 (quoting Timothy S. lost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond: Modijfication of Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1101, 1105 (1986)).
122. 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932).
123. Id.
124. Dowell, 890 F.2d at 1490 (quoting lost, From Swift to Stotts, supra note 121, at
1101, 1110 (1986)).
125. Dowel!, 890 F.2d at 1493.
126. Id. at 1504 (citing Board of Educ. v. Brinknan, 433 U.S. 526, 538 (1979)).
127. Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 635 (1991) (relying on Board of Educ.
v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976), which requires courts to give a school board a precise
statement of its obligations under desegregation decrees, as well as precise statements regarding the termination of those obligations).
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bring the lawsuit.'28
Subsequently, the Supreme Court examined the holding of Swift
and acknowledged that Swift does teach that a decree may not be
modified or terminated if the purposes of the litigation as incorporated in the decree have not been fully achieved. 29 However, the
Tenth Circuit was mistaken in relying on Swift to require an extra
showing of "'grievous wrong evoked by new and unforseen conditions. '""' In Swift, several companies in the meat packing business
entered into a consent decree under which they would not enter any
business that engaged in the manufacturing, selling, or transporting of
any of 114 enumerated food products or thirty other unrelated articles. 3' The decree was designed to remain in force in perpetuity

1 32

Desegregation injunctions, however, unlike the consent decree in
Swift, are designed to be temporary. 133 Since Brown was handed
down, the Court has spoken of desegregation injunctions in the context of the "transition" of public education to a system that is free of
racial discrimination." 4 This notion is also consistent with Milliken
I and Milliken I where the Court held that the desegregation injunc-35
tions must be limited to the scope of the constitutional violation.
If the desegregation decree was designed to outlast the violation, then
a violation of Milliken I would certainly exist."

128. Dowell, 111 S. CL at 635.
129. Id at 636.
130. Id (quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932)). The Court
also noted that the Tenth Circuit's reliance on United States v. W.Y. Grant Co., 345 U.S.
629, 633 (1953), in holding that "compliance alone cannot become the basis for modifying or
dissolving an injunction" was also misplaced, but the focus of the Court's decision is on
Swift. Dowell, 111 S. CL at 636.
131. Swift, 286 U.S. at 111.
132. See id. at 114-15. It should be noted that in Swift, the Court was dealing with a
consent decree, whereas in Dowell, the Court was dealing with a litigation decree. While it
could logically be argued that this distinction may be sufficient to distinguish these cases,
this argument is precluded in the Swift decision itself, where the Court held that its power to
alter or modify an injunction is the same whether "the decree has been entered into after
litigation or consenL" Id.at 114. For a more extensive discussion of this issue, see Hannel,
supra note 53, at 1147-48.
133. Dowe, 111 S. CL at 637.
134. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 436 (1968); Brown 1H, 349 U.S. 294, 299301 (1955). This concept of desegregation injunctions couched in the context of the "transition" to a unitary school system is evidence that since the desegregation injunction was fist
imposed in Brown, the Supreme Court never intended for the injunctions to be permanent.
135. Milliken I1,433 U.S. at 282.
136. Dowel!, 111 S. CL at 637.
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After drawing the temporary/permanent distinction between the
desegregation injunctions and the consent decree in Swift, the Court
reiterated the importance of local control over public education, and
allowing citizens to participate in the development of school programs
so that they may fit local needs. 3
Dissolving a desegregation decree after the local authorities have
operated in compliance with it for a reasonable period of time properly recognizes that "necessary concern for the important values of
local control of public school systems dictates that a federal court's
regulatory control of such systems does not extend beyond the time
required
to remedy the effects of past intentional discrimina"l
tion. 39
Although the Supreme Court did overrule the Tenth Circuit's
decision, the district court's decision was not reinstated. 139 Rather,
the case was remanded so that the district court could "address itself
to whether the School Board had complied in good faith with the
desegregation decree since it was entered, and whether the vestiges of
"
past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practicable. " 4°
In making its decision, the district court should look not only to the
student reassignment plan, but to every facet of school operation:
faculty, staff, transportation, extra-curricular activities, and facilities.141
The majority in Dowell handed down its decision over an outraged dissenting opinion written by Justice Marshall and joined by
Justices Blackmun and Stevens.142 The central theme of the dissent
was that the majority was not true to the spirit of Brown and its
progeny.14 3 Justice Marshall's view is best summed up by his state-

137. Id (relying on Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 742; School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
50 (1973)).
138. Dowell, III S. Ct. at 637 (quoting Spangler v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 1230,
1245 n.5 (1979) (Kennedy, J.,concurring), cited in Milliken I, 473 U.S. at 280-82).
139. Dowell, 111 S. CL at 638.
140. Id
141. Id (referring to the criteria set forth in Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430,
435 (1968)).
142. Dowel!, 111 S. CL at 639 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
143. Id Among the numerous references to these cases, Justice Marshall stated:
In my view, the standard for dissolution of a school desegregation decree must
reflect the central aim of our school desegregation precedents. In (Brown 1],a
unanimous Court declared that racially "[s]eperate educational facilities are inherently unequal." This holding rested on the Court's recognition that state-sponsored
segregation conveys a message of "inferiority as to th[e] status [of Afro-American
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ment, "I believe a desegregation decree cannot be lifted so long as
conditions likely to inflict the stigmatic injury condemned in Brown I
persist and there remain feasible methods of eliminating such conditions." 44 However, nowhere in his opinion does Justice Marshall
explain what "stigmatic" injury is at stake in Dowell. While it is
certainly arguable that segregating public school students by race may
cause educational injury, in terms of depriving the students of the
enrichment that cultural diversity may bring to a school, it is unclear
how such an injury is stigmatic when it is not motivated by discriminatory intent. This distinction is crucial in this area of the law because, as Justice Marshall himself admits, it is the "stigmatic" injury
that Brown and its progeny protect against. 145
The dissent continues by agreeing with the majority's overall
standard for terminating a desegregation decree-that the purpose of
the decree must be fully achieved."4 The disagreement rests in what
constitutes fulfillment of the decree's purposes.147 Specifically, Marshall relies on Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg,148 which requires
school districts to "'make every effort to achieve the greatest possible
degree of actual desegregation and [to] be concerned with the elimination of one-race schools.'" 14 9 The ultimate goal is a "'nonracial
system of public education.'"'" This goal is realized once "school
officials have 'eliminate[d] from the public schools all vestiges of
state imposed segregation,"' whether they exist in criteria set out
Board,52 or even in "'community ...
in Green v. County School
' 53
attitudes toward a school.
school children] in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone."
Id (quoting Brown 1, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954)) (citations omitted).
144. Id (emphasis added). This quote is especially telling because of what it omits.
Nowhere in his dissent does Marshall weigh into his analysis the basic constitutional rule that
the scope of the remedy may not exceed the scope of the violation. See id

145. Id
146. Id at 641 (referring to the standard adopted by the majority which originated in
United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932)).
147. Dowel, 111 S. CL at 641-42.
148. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
149. Id at 643 (quoting Swann v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971)) (emphasis

omitted).
150.
(1968)).
151.
152.
153.
(1973)).

Dowell, III S. CL at 644 (quoting Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 436
Dowell, 111 S. CL at 644 (quoting Swann, 402 U.S. at 15).
391 U.S. at 435.
Dowel, 111 S. CL at 644 (quoting Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 196

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol21/iss2/7

18

Locke: Board of Education v. Dowell: A Look at the New Phase in Desegreg
1992]

BOARD OF EDUCATION V DOWELL

The dissent then continues by noting that the term "vestige" has
never been explicitly defined"s4 and offers as a definition, "any condition.., likely to convey the message of inferiority implicit in a
policy of segregation." 55 The significance of this definition is not
readily apparent until Marshall discusses what seems to be his underlying fear, that the majority does not consider residential segregation
to be a vestige of school desegregation.'5 Marshall's point becomes
even more obvious as his opinion argues that under the majority
holding:

mhe District Court could ignore the effect of residential segregation
in perpetuating racially identifiable schools if the court finds residential segregation to be the result of private decisionmaking and
economics ....There is no basis for the majority's... suggestion
that the result should be different if residential segregation is...
perpetuated by "private decisionmaking" as opposed to being a vestige [of past discrimination]."
This remark indicates a desire to have residential segregation treated
as a vestige of school segregation regardless of what the underlying
facts might indicate. This interpretation is anomalous to the prior case
law, completely wiping out the distinction between de jure and de
facto segregation.
Furthermore, Justice Marshall's stance seems to take desegregation law to an extreme never before contemplated. In Columbus
Board of Education v. Penick,5 ' and Dayton Board of Education v.
Brinkman,'59 the Supreme Court held that if a school system is
found to have once operated under a policy of de jure segregation,
and the schools are presently segregated, there is a presumption that
the present segregation is a result of the past de jure policy.1" Consequently, the school board is still bound to an affirmative duty to
desegregate. 161 Justice Marshall's opinion says that whether or not
the present day segregation resulted from past de jure policies, the
school board is under an affirmative duty to desegregate. This second
argument is as much a departure from the state of desegregation law
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

The term is not even defined by the majority in Dowell.
Dowell, IlII S. Ct. at 644.
See i. at 645-46.
Id at 646.
443 U.S. 449 (1979).
443 U.S. 526 (1979).
See Columbus, 443 U.S. at 458; Dayton, 443 U.S. at 536.
See Columbus, 443 U.S. at 458; Dayton, 443 U.S. at 536.
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as Justice Marshall claims the majority opinion to be.
The best manner by which to analyze the majority opinion and
its compatibility with the prior case law is in light of the dissent's
complaints. In order to do this, the effects of the majority opinion
must be set out. The explicit impact of the majority opinion is not
very complex. It sets out a standard by which the district courts
should review desegregation injunctions: the purposes of the injunction must be fulfilled and the vestiges of past discrimination must be
eliminated to the extent practicable.162 The decision ultimately remains with the district court. 163
Assessing the dissent's criticisms against these simplistic, albeit
extremely broad rules, reveals that however appealing Justice
Marshall's arguments may be at an emotional level, even when recognizing the gravity of the societal problems that are caused by residential segregation, as legal arguments they are seriously flawed.
Before addressing the dissent's flaws, however, one major point
that must be considered is that at issue is the standard for lifting a
desegregation injunction, not for imposing one. Much of the dissenting opinion is spent quoting the rhetoric of Brown and its progeny.
However, most of this rhetoric addresses the effects of pre-remedy
segregation, not how to handle school boards which have complied
with desegregation injunctions in good faith and want relief from the
burdens"6 that these injunctions cause. Although this difference
does not invalidate any of the dissent's reasoning, it does create a
different backdrop against which to analyze the opinion. For example,
the unforseen consequences of the desegregation orders, such as unprecedented "white flight" outweighs any positive effect of court
ordered integration efforts. 65
In addition to the difference in the issue at hand, there are two
specific egregious flaws in the dissenting opinion. The first is that it
draws on the more dramatic rhetoric of the desegregation opinions' 66 without acknowledging the context of that rhetoric. For example, Marshall quotes Swann at length to portray the spirit of the
desegregation law without -ever acknowledging that Swann also im-

162. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying
163. Id
164. Among the most obvious of these burdens
of maintaining the buses, the insurance, etc.
165. See supra note 81. For a more in depth
supra note 81, at 628-65.
166. See supra notes 142-61 and accompanying

text.
is the cost of the busing itself, in terms
discussion of white flight, see Gerwitz,
text.
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plicitly recognizes the importance of the underlying local interest
involved in running a public school system.167 This implicit recognition is especially important because it shows that even when the
Court was still developing the basic guidelines of the desegregation
law, it still appreciated that local concerns were in tension with the
constitutional protections. Consequently, where the constitutional
protections end, the rights of the locality begin. The issue of where to
draw this line is exactly what is addressed in Dowell. By not acknowledging this broader underlying context, Marshall implicitly
dismisses it and consequently appears to be applying the law in a
piecemeal fashion, without acknowledging its underlying concerns.
The second flaw in Marshall's opinion is that he ignores the
boundaries of the allowable remedies under the Equal Protection
Clause and erases the distinction between de facto and de jure segregation. Specifically, although Marshall recognizes, at least in theory,
that the desegregation orders are temporary in nature, 1 he fails to
enunciate a standard. Rather, he makes an appeal to the Court based
on the burdens that racism places on society, regardless of whether or
not the actual violations are caused by a local school board, or just
personal (albeit racist) preferences in residential patterns."6 Although the damage caused may ultimately be the same, their constitutional implications are diametrically opposed. As stated above, Marshall goes so far as to condemn the majority for hinting that the
district courts could ignore residential segregation as a cause of
school segregation if the residential segregation was a result of "private decisionmaking and economics.""' Marshall then drives this
point home by stating that "there is no basis for the majority's...
suggestion that the result should be different if residential segregation
is now perpetuated by 'private decisionmaking."'17 1 This assertion
completely ignores a basic tenet of desegregation law: a constitutional
remedy can only be imposed to rectify a constitutional violation."
Residential segregation that exists as a result of private
decisionmaking and economics is not in itself a constitutional viola-

167. See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text. This recognition is implicit, but
obvious, in the Court's appreciation of the merits of a neighborhood school policy, if the
local school board is inclined to adopt such a policy.
168. Dowell, III S. CL at 641.
169. Id at 645-46.
170. Id at 645.
171. Id at 646.
172. See, e.g., Milliken I, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
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tion. It may only amount to de facto segregation, which is not unconstitutional."7 Justice Marshall has, in reality, created a new violation
where none previously existed.174
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in Board of Education v. Dowell
is not a departure from the previous case law regarding desegregation.
It provides a standard for district courts to review desegregation orders that have been complied with while explicitly recognizing that
the district courts have the discretion to deny a school board's motion
to lift a desegregation injunction if the court is suspicious of the
board's intent. 75 The dissent's opinion is severely flawed in that:
(1) it fails to address the context in which Dowell exists, specifically
in terms of the importance of the local interest in controlling public
schools; and (2) it ignores the distinction between de facto and de
jure segregation, creating a constitutional remedy where none previously existed. These flaws in the dissent's arguments only serve to
further evidence that the majority opinion is in line with preceding
cases.
Although Justice Marshall's dissent is contrary to contemporary
desegregation law, it should not be summarily dismissed. Rather, it
should be read to emphasize the failure of both desegregation remedies and the case law implementing those remedies. Clearly, as we
enter the new phase in desegregation law, the injunctions may be
lifted but the underlying issues have not been resolved.
Justice Marshall's goals could be achieved in three ways not
considered in his opinion: (1) overruling Keyes 76 and eliminating
the distinction between de jure and de facto desegregation; (2) overruling Milliken I,177 in whole or in part; or (3) limiting Milliken I to
its facts by recognizing that residential segregation is often a vestige
prior discrimination, and creating a rebuttable presumption to this
1 78
effect.

173. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
174. It should be noted that the differences between the majority and the dissent in
Dowell could be read as simply differing perspectives on the facts. However, such a reading
seems to oversimplify a major development in the desegregation law and ignore the strength
of the language used by both the views.
175. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 637.
176. Keyes, 413 U.S. 189.

177. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
178. It should be noted that a fourth option, not discussed, is to let the state courts
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Overruling Keyes, however, is senseless. It would create an unnecessary anomaly in well established case law. Eliminating the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation would not only
effectively create a new remedy,17 9 it would render Washington v.
Davist"' and the requirement of discriminatory intent a nullity in
desegregation law. This departure would not only leave the court to
rewrite virtually the entire corpus of the equal protection case law, it
is wholly unnecessary.
Even overruling Milliken I, in whole or in part is unnecessary,
and would cause more inconsistencies in the case law than is warranted. The greatest danger of overruling any part of Milliken I is that
the decision will directly contradict the basic tenet of constitutional
construction: that the scope of the remedy cannot exceed the scope of
the violation. Altering this rule could easily have unforeseeable repercussions when applied outside of the desegregation law, allowing
courts to fashion remedies without limits.
Limiting Milliken I to its facts is the best option. By limiting
Milliken I to its facts, Justice Marshall's goal could be accomplished
while eliminating a host of potential problems. By taking this tack,
the Court could explicitly find as a general rule that residential segregation is a vestige of past discrimination, and then create a rebuttable
presumption to this effect. Although creating a presumption here may
seem to place too high a burden on the school boards, it is really no
more than a logical extension of the already existing presumption that
present day segregation in schools, often coupled with segregated
residential patterns, is presumptively unconstitutional."' Additionally, patterns of white flight could then be traced to this de jure segregation and give the Court the power to fashion broader remedies.

handle the contemporary problems in desegregation law. Presently pending before the courts
of Connecticut is a case in which the plaintiffs are trying to argue that the state constitution

permits remedies that affect both the city in which unconstitutional segregation is found, and
the suburbs in which no violation occurred. Sheff v. O'Neill, 609 A.2d 1072 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1992). This is a similar argument to the one that failed in the U.S. Supreme Court in
Milliken L The effect of the plaintiffs' success at the state level would be to allow Justice
Marshall's goals in the Dowell dissent to be realized indirectly. However, as previously
discussed, this would still have effect of eliminating distinction between de jure and de facto
desegregation and all the problems that this would entail. See supra notes 167-74 and accom-

panying text. This possibility is not fully discussed in the text because it falls outside of the
menu of affirmative choices for the Supreme Court.
179. See supra notes 167-74 and accompanying text.
180. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
181. See e.g., Board of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Board of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
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Although this option sounds similar to Justice Marshall's dissent
in Dowell, it is different in one important respect: it does not erase
the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation. Rather, it
just recasts the case law, decreasing the value of the underlying facts
of Milliken I, without actually altering any of the rules applied in that
case. Additionally, the scope of the remedy would not exceed the
scope of the violation. Finding residential segregation to be a vestige
of prior segregation would simply increase the scope of the violation.
This solution should be especially palatable because it does not bind
the lower courts to one specific outcome. It still allows the school
boards to show that residential patterns are not vestiges of prior discriminatory intent, but rather a result of personal decisionmaking. If a
school board can meet this test, unlike the test posited in Marshall's
dissent, then the previously issued injunction may be lifted as it was
in Dowell.
Given the choices that could be adopted to reach Justice
Marshall's goals as set out in his dissent in Dowell, the best option is
to limit Milliken I to its facts and create a rebuttable presumption that
residential segregation is a vestige of prior discrimination. This presumption would afford more protection to minority children in school
districts where desegregation plans have already been implemented for
a protracted period of time, but the effects of segregation are still felt,
while leaving well entrenched case law essentially intact.
Steven L Locke
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